Archive for March 2007

Education, Poverty Reduction and Economic Growth

March 10, 2007

Educational attainment has a positive impact on economic growth and poverty reduction. The microeconomic literature has also established a clear relationship between educational attainment and individual income. Educational attainment is positively linked with technological adaptation, innovation, and increased productivity, generating positive spin-off and growth effects for the economy. Non-economic factors also posit a positive role for education: it is a basic human development capability.  Yet for many of the world’s poor, access to education remains out of reach. Improvements have taken place in school attainment but many challenges remain.

Achieving universal primary education (UPE) by 2015 is a Millennium Development Goal.  The failure to achieve UPE and reduced illiteracy rates by 2000 that was agreed by the global community at the World Conference on Education for all at Jomtien, Thailand, was again adopted by 180 nations at the World Education Forum at Dakar in 2000.  Education helps in the achievement of all of the other Millennium Development Goals such as poverty reduction, gender equity, child and maternal health, lower HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases, and environmental stability. 
In upcoming weeks we will examine the progress being made by developing economies in achieving educational attainment, chiefly at the primary level and the challenges that confront these economies.  We will also examine the initiatives aimed at achieving universal education and in particular universal primary completion, as well as the financial resources needed at the domestic and international donor level, the main challenge facing low income countries today.
Sourec: World Bank Povrety And Growth Program Blog

Debt Relief and Low-Income Countries

March 4, 2007

External debt began to be a problem for developing countries in the 1980s.  Middle-income countries were borrowing from private creditors, chiefly commercial banks, while low-income countries without access to private finance borrowed either directly from other governments or from their export credit agencies (ECAs) or through private loans insured for payment by ECAs. Official creditors were willing to take the risks of what was called “national interest” lending and saw the provision of commercially-priced export credit guarantees as a compliment to the grants and concessional loans being made as part of their official development assistance (ODA).
The international financial community in recognizing the adverse effects of large debt stocks on growth, poverty reduction and external viability offered assistance in the form of debt relief from official and multilateral creditors. This took place mainly through Paris Club reschedulings, reduction in the stock of outstanding debt under the Brady plan, and concessional financing from international financial institutions.
The outcomes from the debt relief initiatives saw a decrease in the external debt of middle-income countries. However, many low income countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa continued to suffer from heavy external debt burdens and high rates of poverty even after initial debt relief operations had been implemented. Poor countries, particularly in Sub Saharan Africa continued to face difficulties in meeting their external debt commitments due to a confluence of factors, including the accumulation of nonconcessional debt from official export credits, poor debt management practices, worsening debtors’ terms of trade, weak macroeconomic policies and poor governance, civil wars and drought (see Daseking and Powell).

A Taxonomy of Initiatives

As low income debt burdens increased, and as the private sector began pulling out, official creditors stepped into the void and provided assistance in the form of non-concessional flow reschedulings at the Paris Club. Assistance was also provided in the form of new lending by multilaterals, with the World Bank, the IMF and multilateral development banks continuing to support the adjustment programs of debtor countries.
Paris Club reschedulings were used extensively by low income countries: between 1976 and 1988 81 non-concessional flow rescheduling that allowed for payments close to US$23 billion to be delayed were agreed with 27 countries. These same countries came to be identified as heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs).  The debt reschedulings facilitated the financing of adjustment programs and provided cash flow relief.  However, despite these reschedulings, the debt service paid by these countries increased from about 17 percent of exports on average in 1980 to 30 percent in 1986 and low income country debt burdens also increased. 

The increasing debt stocks were seen as unsustainable and a number of debt relief initiatives were introduced during the late 1980s and the 1990s. In 1987, Nigel Lawson, the then UK Chancellor of the Exchequer argued that Paris Club reschedulings for low income countries should be conducted at below-market rates of interest.  Thus for the first time, governments were being asked to accept concessional reschedulings on ECA debts. The French proposed a reduction of 33 percent in payments falling due and the US accepted rescheduling based on longer grace periods.  The combination of the suggestions from the UK, French and US governments came to be called the Toronto terms and together facilitated a reduction in the net present value of eligible debt by up to one third.  The Toronto terms marked the beginning of a number of schemes targeted at debt relief for poor countries.

The enhanced Toronto terms or London terms introduced in December 1991 aimed at reducing the net present value of debt up to one half. Subsequently, in January 1995, the Naples terms provided for a reduction in net present value of debt up to two thirds.  In the context of the HIPC initiative, creditors agreed to an 80 percent reduction in net present value in November 1996 – the Lyon terms. The Cologne terms introduced in November 1999 allowed the concessionality of debt relief operations to be reduced by 90 percent reduction of net present value.  

Thus, under the Toronto terms, 20 low-income countries received debt reschedulings amounting to almost US$6 billion of payments falling due being either partially cancelled or rescheduled on a concessional basis.  Following the introduction of Naples terms in January 1995, creditors agreed that, after three years of good performance by a debtor country, they would be prepared to consider an agreement covering the full stock of eligible debt, not just the debt service flows falling due. Seven agreements covered the full stock of debt under the Naples terms with a total of approximately $17 billion of payments being either partially forgiven or rescheduled on concessional terms, i.e. at low interest rates over the medium and long term. 

Creditors were by and large able to control the growth of low income debt payments through concessional rescheduling techniques. Average paid debt service ratio for HIPCs peaked at about 30 percent of exports in 1986, falling to 17 percent on average in 1997.  Aggregate debt service for the HIPC as a group fell to 14 percent of aggregate exports in 1997 lower than for the Moderately Indebted Low-Income Countries.  Moreover, rescheduling ensured that official transfers remained positive to low-income countries (Daseking and Powell).  
From 1987 onwards new initiatives aimed at promoting debt relief for low-income countries were also introduced by multilateral institutions.  At the G-7 summit in Venice in 1987, the IMF unveiled its plan—the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF)—for new concessional IMF lending for low income countries.  The ESAF would be financed by grants from wealthier member countries. The ESAF succeeded the structural adjustment facility (SAF) that was established in 1986 and was itself succeeded by the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) in 1999. The ESAF was available to low-income member countries facing protracted balance of payments problems and provided resources at an annual interest rate of 0.5 percent, repayable over 10 years, including a grace period of 51/2 years. The PRGF has the same terms.

Next week: the Initiative for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs)
Article Source: World Bank Poverty and Growth Program Blog

Employment and Shared Growth Website Launch

March 4, 2007

Our colleagues from the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Group have recently launched the new Employment and Shared Growth web-site.

In their own words:

This website is designed to help fill the gap between the awareness of the importance of employment and labor market mobility as engines of development and poverty reduction, and the attention this issue receives in mainstream economic analysis and policy-making.

(Via Poverty Net)
Source: World Bank Poverty and Growth Program Blog

Essay competitions

March 4, 2007

Two different essay competitions have been recently launched. $5,000 and $1,000 prizes up for grabs.

The World Bank and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007 essay competition. How does corruption affect your life? What can you do to fight the corruption that you face?

Deadline is March 15. More information and instructions to apply here.

The Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) has launched its 2007 Youth Essay Competition.

 We want to know what they think about the situation in their countries and the innovative solutions that they propose. We are especially interested to hear what citizens of non-OECD countries have to say, and how their own experiences have helped them develop concrete solutions to the problems facing their nations.

 See the full announcement and instructions to apply in CIPE’s blog.
Source: World Bank Poverty and Growth Program Blog

Goodbye Washington Consensus …

March 3, 2007

Hello Washington Confusion?

In case you missed before, that is the title of a paper by Dani Rodrik now published in the JEL, where he discusses (often praising) the World Bank’s Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform, a study on development lessons of the 1990s.

The World Bank’s Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform (2005, henceforth Learning from Reform) is one of a spate of recent attempts at making sense of the facts of the last decade and a half, and probably the most intelligent. In fact, it is a rather extraordinary document insofar as it shows how far we have come from the original Washington Consensus.

Coming from the institution that is one of the chief architects of the reforms of the last twenty years, Learning from Reform is a genuinely interesting document: it represents a mea culpa as well as a way forward. It pushes us to think harder and deeper about the economics of reform than anything else out there. It warns us to be skeptical of top-down, comprehensive, universal solutions—no matter how well-intentioned they may be. And it reminds us that the requisite economic analysis—hard as it is, in the absence of specific blueprints—has to be done case by case.

The Augmented Washington Consensus

WC Source: Dani Rodrik, Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion?
Article Source: World Bank Poverty and Growth Program Blog

Why isn’t financial deepening happening in the poor countries?

March 3, 2007

While global financial integration has been progressing well, financial deepening is not.  Only a handful of emerging market economies are benefiting from large capital inflows in the form of FDI.   In countries like Kenya where the capital account is open and foreign bank entry has long been allowed, capital market remains shallow and real interest rate remains high, hindering the private sector development. 

Why is there a weak association between financial openness and financial deepening in the poor countries?  In a November conference, Professors Ju and Wei seemed to have provided an answer.  In their paper “A Solution to Two Paradoxes of International Capital Flows“, they provide a framework to study the role of financial and property right institutions in determining patterns of capital flows.  Their two-sector model features differentiating returns to financial investment and physical investment, as financial investors have to share the return to capital with entrepreneurs.  The more developed a financial system is, the greater the slice that goes to the financial investors.  As an implication, a poor country with an inefficient financial sector may experience a large outflow of financial capital, but together with inward FDI, resulting in a small net inflow.  The model also incorporates property rights protection as another institution.  Countries with poor property rights protection may well experience an outflow of financial capital without a compensating inflow of FDI.

First, the quality of the financial system and expropriation risk play crucial roles in the patterns of capital flows.  Second, financial capital flows and FDI can move in either the same or the opposite directions.  And last, in a world of frictionless capital markets and identical expropriation risks,  the less developed financial system is completely bypassed,  and that is, all capital owned by the country with the less developed financial system will leave the country in the form of financial capital outflows, but physical capital (and projects) re-enters the country in the form of FDI.  That implies, the less developed financial system serves no financial intermediation at all in the equilibrium.

This and other crucial issues will be discussed in WBI’s Global Senior Policy Seminar on “Capital Flows, Financial Integration and Stability” to be held on April 23-26, Paris France.  For information and registration, please click here.
Article Source: World Bank Poverty and Growth Program Blog

External Indebtedness, Growth and Poverty: Empirical Studies

March 3, 2007

Notwithstanding the attractiveness of the debt overhang hypothesis as an explanation for the high debt-low growth nexus, empirical evidence of the effects of debt overhang has been mixed. For example, Claessens found that five of the 29 middle-income countries in his sample were on the wrong side of the Laffer debt curve, suggesting that partial debt reduction would increase the expected repayment to the creditors. For middle-income countries, Warner concludes that the debt crisis did not depress investment.  Several other studies have concluded that it is difficult to disentangle the impact of debt variables on growth and the role of debt overhang from other factors on growth and that debt burden can negatively impact other factors (e.g., debt can affect domestic real interest rates which can impact on investment and growth).

The second difficulty relates to the crowding out effect. Most studies on investment equations do not distinguish between these two effects. In this context, statistically significant debt variables do not isolate the debt overhang effect. To distinguish between these two effects, both contemporaneous debt service and a variable capturing the burden of future debt service such as the debt stock or the net present value (NPV) of future debt service should be included in the regression analysis.  In a recent study, Patillo et al. of IMF show that for the 93 developing countries that they examine, there seems to be a nonlinear, Laffer-type relationship between debt and growth. They find that the average impact of external debt on per capita growth appears to be negative for NPV of debt levels above 160–170 percent of exports and 35–40 percent of GDP. Furthermore, their results suggest that doubling debt levels slows per capita GDP growth by about half to a full percent.

Evolution of Average Per Capita Income, Debt and Poverty Indicators

empiric Two main findings could be drawn when analyzing the bivariate relationship between per capita GDP, nonincome poverty indicators and debt indicators:

  • First, there seems to be a relationship between real GDP per capita and health indicators. Life expectancy  increases with real per capita GDP.
  • Second, the correlation matrix indicates that external debt burden indicators are negatively correlated with GDP per capita and life expectancy, and positively correlated with infant mortality rate, indicating possible adverse impact of indebtedness on income and health outcome indicators. These findings are confirmed by Exhibit below, which compares poverty indicators for countries with NPV of debt less than 150 percent of exports and NPV of debt higher than 150 percent of exports, and for countries with nominal debt to GDP less and higher than 40 percent. Poverty indicators appear to be worse in countries with NPV of debt to export higher than 150 percent and in countries with nominal debt to GDP higher than 40 percent.

Poverty Indicators by Income Groups (averages)
  indicators Poverty Indicators by External Indebtedness Groups (averages)

last            
Article Source: World Bank Poverty and Growth Program Blog

World Day to Overcome Extreme Poverty

March 3, 2007

Did you know that October 17th is the World Day to Overcome Extreme Poverty, officially recognised by the United Nations in 1992?

Yes, the next one is still far away but you can already support this initiative signing the call to action.
Article Source: World Bank Poverty and Growth Program Blog

Gender, Economic Development and Poverty Reduction: E-learning course

March 3, 2007

The Poverty and Growth Program of the World Bank Institute is offering an Internet course on Gender, Economic Development and Poverty Reduction, which will take place from 4 – 30 March, 2007.

 

The course will explore the concepts of gender and gender inequality, the relationship between gender inequality and poverty, and discuss the importance of gender issues in economic development.

Apply online

Deadline to apply is February 25th, 2007
Article Source: World Bank Poverty and Growth Program Blog

External Indebtedness, Growth and Poverty

March 3, 2007

Studies investigating the link between external debt and growth place a strong emphasis on the role of investment. In effect, large debt stocks are expected to lower growth by hindering investment (debt overhang hypothesis). Under this channel, outstanding debt ultimately becomes so large that investment will remain inefficiently low without sizable debt or debt service reduction, with ever larger shares of a country’s resources transferred abroad for debt servicing. 

Another strand of the debt overhang theory emphasizes the point that large debt stocks increase expectations that debt service tends to be financed by distortionary measures (inflation or other punitive taxes or arbitrary expenditure cuts). Under such uncertainty, private investors will prefer to exercise their option of waiting and may choose to invest less, or divert their resources towards quick, financial returns with high risk, or resort to transfer their money abroad (capital flight).
Another important component of the debt overhang theory is the so-called Laffer debt curve. This graphs shows expected debt repayment against the face value of debt service. It shows that as outstanding debt increases beyond a threshold level—to “debt overhang” levels—even as the debt stock rises, a country’s expected repayments begin to fall as governments begin to default on debt so as to avoid the damaging impacts of very high debt service. (See Patillo et al. (2002), who discuss the possible nonlinear relationship between debt and growth, for details).

Debt “Laffer Curve”

                    leffer         Source: Pattilio, Poirson and Ricci, 2002 The crowding-out effect of debt service payments on social spending is another plausible channel through which high debt impacts growth. Underlying the debt relief debate is the belief that fiscal resources released by the debt relief will be channeled towards social sectors, including health, education, water, sanitation and other essential services to the poor. It is also believed that social spending increases lead to better social outcomes, as supported by a wide-ranging study on 48 Sub-Saharan African countries for the period 1980-99, which found that absolute social spending allocations are paramount in determining social outcomes. Thus a key component of poverty reduction strategies in low-income countries is for countries to focus on “investing in people.”  Increased pro-poor spending is widely regarded as crucial for low-income countries to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which includes goals for reducing child and infant mortality rates and improving education enrollment rates. In this context, high levels of indebtedness, due to the attendant high debt service, is assumed to lead to a reduction in available resources to meet the needs of the poor.
Finally, high-debt countries are often perceived by international financial markets and donors as exhibiting problems of economic mismanagement and bad governance, and therefore to be especially risky for investment. High indebtedness could then lead to a decline in new flows of external resources, leading in turn to a reduction in poverty-related spending.

Next Friday: Empirical Studies
Article Source: World Bank Poverty and Growth Program Blog